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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE TAFT HARTLEY ACT
TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH1
A case which is two years old, NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corp.,2 is still the springboard into the discussion of bargain-
able issues under the Taft-Hartley Act requirement to bargain in good
faith. The facts in Borg-Warner reveal that a certified international
union submitted a proposed collective bargaining contract. Management
made a counter-proposal, recognizing the local as sole bargaining agent
and providing that a strike could not be called, or the contract ter-
minated or modified, unless a majority of employees in the unit, in-
cluding non-members, approved such action by secret ballot. A break-
down in negotiations occurred when the employers adamantly insisted
on the proposals indicated. The union filed a charge with the National
Labor Relations Board alleging a refusal to bargain. The United States
Supreme Court held that an employer's insistence on inclusion in the
contract of a strike ballot clause and a recognition clause, naming a
local union rather than the international certified union as the bargain-
ing party to the contract, was a violation of a statutory bargaining
duty.3 The proposals were found not within the category specified by
the Taft-Hartley Act for mandatory bargaining.4
The court laid down three categories of proposals and rules that ap-
ply to each: 1) Those that clearly would be illegal and forbidden under
the law, such as proposals for a closed shop. Bargaining on such issues
may not be required and they may not be included even if the other
party agrees. 2) Those that may be placed on the bargaining table for
voluntary bargaining and agreement. The other party may not be re-
quired to bargain on these issues and insistence on them as a condition
to execution of a contract will be a violation of the bargaining duty.
3) Those that fall within scope of mandatory bargaining. The other
party must bargain on such proposals and the party advancing them
may insist on their inclusion in any executed contract.
A difficult and controversial problem is the determination of what
is included in the last category. The court offered this test: A mandatory
subject of bargaining must deal with the relations between the em-
ployer and employees, and not between the employees and their union.
' What constitutes good faith is beyond the scope of this comment. Emphasis
is on subjects which are or are not bargainable.2356 U.S. 342 (1958).
361 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (5) (1952) Labor
Management Relations Act. "It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of employees, sub-ject to the provisions of section 9 (a)".
461 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. §158 (d) (1952). "For the pur-
poses of this section to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."
[Vol. 44
COMMENTS
It relied on NLRB v. Corsicana Cotton Mills5 in which the Fifth
Circuit held that a ratification clause, which was submitted by the com-
pany to the union, was an attempt to interfere with the internal affairs
of the union. NLRB v. Dalton Telephone Co.G was cited in support of
the holding that good faith was immaterial if the subject was not within
the area of mandatory bargaining.
The court followed NLRB v. Brooks7 and rejected Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB- In the former case the company refused to bargain
with the union because of evidence that the union might not represent
the majority. It was held that protecting the employees in this way is not
an obligatory subject of collective bargaining. The latter case held that
the strike vote and contract ratification clauses are within the provisions
of the act.9 The court here based its decision on the reasoning that if
employers can demand negotiation over employees' total relinquishment
of their right to strike during the contract period, as decided in NLRB
v. Shell Oil Co.,'* they can necessarily insist on bargaining over partial
renunciation of the right. Expressly rejecting the theory that all matters
of union "internal affairs" are beyond the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing, the court pointed out that the strike vote and contract ratification
were matters that affected all the employees in the unit, and therefore
the union's argument that they involved only its internal affairs was
not supportable."
The Borg-Warner decision distinguished the no-strike clause from
the strike vote clause. It was noted that the no-strike clause involves
the employees' right to strike and the exercise of this right is entrusted
to the bargaining representative who has the power to waive it in a
contract. The strike-ballot was explained as primarily concerned with
the mechanics of testing a statutory representative's power to call a
strike, or terminate or amend the contract during its term and only
incidentally limiting the individual's right to strike. As such, it is a
purely internal matter unrelated to any condition of employment. The
Court felt that the strike-ballot was an attempt to by-pass the union
in the process of bargaining and deal with the employees directly as
individuals.
The four dissenters asserted that this was an illogical distinction.
They maintained that there is really no difference since the "no-strike"
5 178 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949).6 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951).
7348 U.S. 96 (1954).
8 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
961 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. §159 (a) (1952) of the
N.L.R.A. Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment. Supra notes 3 and 4.




clause and the "strike vote" clause both affect the employee-employer
relationship. In passing it was noted that the effect of a ballot clause
is to determine the time of the strike. In addition to this the minority
questioned the propriety of determining what subjects are mandatory.
They emphasized good faith should be the sole test. They claimed that
as long as the proposals are lawful, some should not be ruled as proper
while others are not. In reaching this conclusion, they relied on NLRB
v. American National Insurance.12
In American National Insurance the union submitted a clause pro-
viding for the arbitration of all grievances. Management, rejecting
this provision, refused to agree to any contract which did not reserve
to the employer, without recourse to arbitration, the sole control of
hiring, firing, promotions, demotions and the determination of work
schedules. The NLRB finding that the employer had committed the
unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain collectively under Sections
8(a) (1) and (5) of the amended National Labor Relations Act, or-
dered the employer to cease insisting on unilateral control of condi-
tions of employment as a prerequisite of any agreement. On certiorari
to review the Fifth Circuit's refusal to enforce the NLRB order, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.
It concluded that bargaining for unilateral control of conditions of em-
ployment was not, per se, a refusal to bargain collectively.3 The duty
to bargain collectively is to be determined by the application of the
good faith bargaining standards of the amended act 4 to the facts of
each case.
The general category of mandatory subjects for bargaining, as en-
compassed by the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment," includes but is not limited to the following: Discharge
of employees,1 5 seniority,16 , working schedules,1 7 union security,'
check-off,' 9 piece rates or other incentive pay rates, 20 vacations, 21 in-
dividual merit raises, 22 transfer of present employees and other pertinent
12343 U.S. 395 (1952), affirming 187 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1951).
1a See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947),
where the union contract included a clause giving management exclusive con-
trol over subcontracting of work. Typical management function clauses are
collected in Teller, Management Functions Under Collective Bargaining, 96,
97 (1947).
14 Supra note 4.
'5 National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
16 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), ce r t. d e n i ed,
336 U.S. 960 (1949).
17 Hallman & Boggs Truck Co. v. NLRB, 95 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1951).
is NLRB v. Andrew-Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1949). See also
Harcourt & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 892 (1952).
19 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
20 NLRB v. East Texas Steel Casting Co., 211 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1954).
'21 Phelps-Dodge Copper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 101 NLRB 360 (1952).
22 NLRB v. J. H. Allison Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), 165 F.2d 766 (6th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
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questions involved in the removal of a plant to a new location,23 in-
clusion of so-called "side agreements" in the contract,2 incorporation
of existing practices into the contract,2 5 plant rules establishing rest or
lunch periods, 26 company owned houses used by employees,27 bonuses
at Christmas, 28 stock bonuses, 29 retirement plan,30 group health and
accident insurance programs, 3' price of meals charged at lumber camp,32
and stock purchase plans for employees. 3
The category of voluntary subjects for permissible bargaining which
are outside the statute because unrelated to wages, hours or working
conditions include: The size and membership of employer or union
bargaining teams ;' the composition of employees' shop committee;32
a requirement that a contract must be ratified by secret employee bal-
lot;36 a clause that a contract will become void whenever more than
50% of the employees fail to authorize the check-off ;37 an agreement
that the union first organize the industry before the employer would
bargain ;3s a requirement that a union post a performance bond ;39 a
requirement that a union comply with certain non-mandatory state
licensing requirements ,- a proposal that the union confine its repre-
sentation to member employees ;41 a condition that non-members be
23 Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
24Ore. Coast Operators Assn. v. NLRB, 113 N.L.R.B. 1338 (1955); entfd
246 F. 2d 280 (9th Cir. 1957).
25 Natl. Carbon Div., Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 100 N.L.R.B. 689 (1952);
amended without affecting the point, 105 N.L.R.B. 441 (1953).26 Natl. Grinding Wheel Co. v. NLRB, 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948).
27NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, 190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951) and NLRB v.
Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953). However in
NLRB v. Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953), the Fifth
Circuit refused to enforce a NLRB order directing an employer to bar-
gain with a union over rents charged employees for co-owned houses. The
Court said it found no evidence that the rents were lower than those charged
elsewhere in the area. It added that employees weren't required to use the
company houses.
2 NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pound Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951); enf'd 199 F. 2d
713 (2d Cir. 1952).
29 United Shoe Machinery Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1951).
30 Tide Water Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
-3 W. W. Cross & Co. Inc. v. NLRB, 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948) ; enf'd 174 F.2d
875 (1st Cir. 1949).
- Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. NLRB, 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
.3 Richfield Oil Co. v. NLRB, 110 N.L.R.B. 356 (1954); enf'd 231 F.2d 717(C.A.D.C. 1956) ; cert. denied 351 U.S. 909 (1956).34 Am. Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951);
affirmed 345 U.S. 100 (1953). N.L.R.B. v. Deena Aartware, 198 F.2d 645
(6th Cir. 1952) ; cert. denied 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
35 Iron Castings Inc. v. NLRB, 114 N.L.R.B. 739 (1955).
36 NLRB v. Darlington Veneer Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1955); enfd 236
F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956).
37 Ibid.
38 NLRB v. Geo. Pilling & Son, 119 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1941).3 9 Taormina Co. v. NLRB, 94 N.L.R.B. 884 (1951); enfd 207 F.2d 251 (5th
Cir. 1953).
40 Supra, note 6.
4lMcquay-Norris Mfg Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1940); cert.
denied 313 U.S. 56? (1941).
19601
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
given the right to vote at union meetings ;12 an understanding that bar-
gaining be conditioned on termination of a current strike,"3 and a de-
mand that the contract be countersigned by at least one employee. 41
The employer takes a risk whenever he insists on some proposal
to a point of impasse. It is crucial that it be a mandatory subject and
it is incumbent upon him to know that it falls in this category. There
is no clear guide to compulsory bargaining. Statutory provisions are
indefinite and do not state explicitly what subjects are included. 41
Congress gave the statute flexibility, which enables it to meet the in-
creasing problems arising from the employer-employee relationship.
The United States Supreme Court has stated the statutory collective
bargaining duty includes bargaining "about the exceptional as well as
routine matters affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of em-
ployment." 40
Since there is a failure to define terms it has been left to the case
decisions to give meaning to these sections.47 Tough cases often grew
out of management claims of an inherent right to run it's business.
In Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,48 the Board rejected the employer's con-
tention that holidays, vacations and bonuses were matters that could
be withdrawn from bargaining where the company desired to grant
such benefits as a gratuity. The Board ordered management to bargain
with the union as the representative of its employees. In NLRB v.
Reed and Prince A'Ifg. Co.,49 the Court of Appeals held a clause, re-
quiring agreement that the union would not request or demand either
a closed shop agreement or the check-off system, was against public
policy in that it forestalled future collective bargaining upon matters
which were frequent subjects of negotiation between employers and
employees. In NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,5° the union re-
quested the inclusion of a provision prohibiting discrimination based
upon union affiliation. The employer refused to agree to the union's
proposal. The decision held that such refusal demonstrated bad faith,
stating that "clauses prohibiting discrimination because of union af-
filiation are frequently sought by labor organizations to give the em-
ployees a 'feeling of security' in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
the act and such clauses are not uncommonly embodied in collective
42 Supra note 5.
43NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied
347 U.S. 953 (1954).
44Stylecraft Furniture Co. v. NLRB, 111 N.L.R.B. 930 (1955).
45 Supra note 3.
46Railroad Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 347 (1944).
4 Supra notes 2, 3, and 9.
4824 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940) ; enforced 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941) ; cert. denied
313 U.S. 595 (1940).
49 Supra note 19.
50 37 N.L.R.B. 100 (1941) ; enforced 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
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bargaining contracts."'5 The Board found that a refusal of the em-
ployer to agree to the requested provision was a "refusal to do what
reasonable and fairminded men are ordinarily willing to do and there-
fore a refusal to bargain."52 In NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co.,53 the union
made proposals relating to Sunday, holiday and overtime work. The
employer refused to embody any of them in an agreement on the
grounds they were already covered by Federal Law. The Court re-
ferred to the matters as "essential principles" and ordered further
bargaining. In NLRB v. I. H. Allison & Co.,54 an employer refused
to bargain on merit wage increases because the employer said such
"are not bargainable issues" since they are "an exclusively managerial
function." The Board stated "we are of the opinion that merit increases
are an integral part of the wage structure, and as such, constitute a
proper subject of collective bargaining." 5 W. W. Cross and Co. v.
NLRB5 ' considered health and accident and insurance plans as matters
for negotiation. The management contended that the language of the
statute should be limited to matters historically the subjects of collec-
tive bargaining. This position was rejected by the court on the theory
that Congress did not intend to restrict bargaining to those issues
common in 1935. "On the contrary," the court said, "we think Con-
gress intended to impose on employers a duty to bargain collectively
with employees' representative with respect to any matter which might
in the future emerge as a bone of contention between them provided,
of course, it should be a matter 'in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.' ,, In The Ameri-
can National Insurance Case,58 the company insisted on unilateral con-
trol of conditions of employment as a condition to an agreement. The
court decided a common collective bargaining practice "is an issue for
determination across the bargaining table." 59
As to subjects not yet determined the decisions point the way to
future determinations, but not too clearly. To predict bargainability
one must resort to past standards and criterions to determine if the
subject is covered. Inland Steel v. NLRB60 held that "wages" include
all emoluments of value which may accrue out of the employment re-
lationship and defined "conditions of employment" as meaning those
terms under which employment is granted or taken away. The latter
51 Id. at 121.
52 Ibid.
5 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941).
54Supra note 22.
5570 N.L.R.B. 377, 378.
56 Supra note 31.
5 Id. at 878.
58 Supra note 12.
59 Id. at 409.60 Supra note 16.
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definition has not resulted in a fixed and certain interpretation. How-
ever, the wage definition has been considered broad enough to make
the entire area of fringe benefits mandatorily bargainable.6 ' The Singer
Mfg.6 2 decision declared that the determination of mandatory subjects
depended on a twofold test: "an integral part of the earnings and
working conditions of the employees" and "matters which are gener-
ally the subjects of collective bargaining. ' 63 The court in a later ruling
proclaimed "frequent subjects of negotiation between employers and
employees" as a test.64 Still another test was added in the Montgomery-
Ward & Co. determination. It permitted clauses introduced to give
employees a "feeling of security" which are not uncommonly embodied
in collective bargaining contracts. This reasoning has since been re-
jected.6 6 A test of this nature has practically no limitations, since many
clauses are sought by the union to give employees a "feeling of secur-
ity." The "essential principles" criterion used in NLRB v. Boss Mfg.
Co. 67 has also failed to provide a predictable standard by which
parties may know their ultimate legal position in a controversy.
W. W. Cross and Co.68 appears to abandon past criterions for de-
termining the subjects for bargaining. Under the standard devised in
this case a party can no longer claim that because the other parties
have not bargained, the issue is not mandatory.
A later and more extreme case in this area is American National
Insurance v. NLRB69 which followed the Singer Mfg.70 conclusion.
The decision seems to embrace within the scope of bargaining, func-
tions and claimed rights of management whether within the language
of section 9(A) or not. The result could be the addition of elements
of management function to the bargaining agenda.
Though the court has accepted a subject as one which falls in the
mandatory category, a party may be found guilty of a refusal to bargain
because of lack of good faith. Thus the same result is arrived at as
though it had been found to be non-mandatory. In Majure v. NLRB,7"
the company showed no willingness to alter the position by which it
reserved the right of unilateral action as to wages, hours, and working
conditions. The board found bad faith. The tendency of the board and
61 Supra notes 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33.
62 Supra note 48.
63 Supra note 31, at 878.
64 Supra note 19.
65 Supra note 50.
66 NLRB v. I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1954).
67 Supra note 53.
68 Supra note 31.
69 Supra note 12.
7 0 Supra note 48.
71 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952).
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court has been to find bad faith per se from insistence on these rights
even though the act doesn't compel agreement.7 2
It may be questioned whether the Court in Borg-Warner made a
valid distinction when it differentiated between the "no-strike clause"
and the "strike ballot clause." It is a recognized principle that an
employer's insistence on the inclusion of a no-strike clause in any con-
tract which may be executed, is not a refusal to bargain where it ap-
pears that the bargaining was otherwise in good faith.71 In Borg-Warner,
the Court declared the two clauses required the application of different
rules of law. Basically their effect is as follows: In agreements where
there is a no-strike clause, the union agrees not to strike and the com-
pany agrees not to lock out during the term of the collective labor
agreement; in the strike vote clause situation the representatives of
the union surrender the right to strike after the contract has been
executed. Theoretically, there is a right of employees to strike with
certain limitations and this right may be waived. Practically, in both of
these cases there is a waiver of this right under different conditions,
but not sufficiently different to change the rule of law.7- It has been
pointed out that when the Seventh Circuit said there was a difference
without substance, it was never mentioned that in one both were bound
by contract, but in the other, there is no contract in effect and the
company is not bound. 5 However, it is submitted that the distinction
between the "no-strike clause" and the "strike ballot clause" is un-
realistic. Certainly both affect the employer-employee relationship and
should be placed in the same category of subjects affecting conditions
of employment upon which bargaining is required and upon which
there may be insistence to point of impasse.
Since there is no all inclusive clear guide to compulsory bargaining,
many feel that the Board and courts should be left free to judge each
case individually and vary the rule with the needs of the company,
industry and economy.76 Two reactions to the uncertainty of such un-
defined limits are: 1) The board should draw a specific list of bargain-
able issues so that there is no flexibility. 77 2) Boards and courts shouldn't
judge whether an issue is bargainable according to wages, hours and
other conditions of employment, but the employer should be required
to bargain on subjects that have become bargainable by custom and
72Supra note 4; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
73 Burns Brick Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 389 (1948).
74 Supra note 8.
75 43 Geo. L. J. 309 (1955).
76 Proper Subjects for Collective Bargaining, Ad. Hoc. v. Predictive Definition,
58 Yale L. J. 803 (1949).7 7 The Duty to Bargain: Bargainable Issues. 50 Nw. U. L. Rev. 279.
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tradition in order to show that he was bargaining in good faith as re-
quired by the act.
78
Those favoring the latter view7 9 contend the act did not contemplate
defining the scope of collective bargaining, but it's function was to
write the principle of majority rule into the new statutes.s0 Along these
lines it has been decided that the purpose of the act is to encourage the
voluntary settlement of labor-management disputes through private ne-
gotiation,s but that the act doesn't attempt to prescribe the substantive
terms which such an agreement must contain.8 2 The National Labor
Relations Act has been said to absorb and give statutory approval to
the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in
the United States.S3 Senator Walsh, speaking of the Wagner Act,
stated :
When the employees have chosen their organization, when
they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to
do is to escort them to the door of the employer and say 'here
they are, the legal representatives of your employees.' What
happens behind those doors is not inquired into and the bill does
not seek to inquire into it.s 4
There are those, however, who say Congress clearly intended to
establish more than a simple procedure and thus require parties to talk
about something. Since the effectiveness of this mandate would be
greatly reduced if no one were authorized to define the subject matter
of bargaining, the courts seem justified in assuming the duty they have
undertaken."5 Most important in this case, is the court's approval of
the NLRB's power to decide what may be insisted to the point of im-
passe and what may not. Until recently the exact issue in these cases
has rarely been whether or not a subject was properly bargainable, but
rather whether the employer had bargained in good faith.,
It is submitted that the better reasoning is to be found in the view
which maintains that insistence upon proposals, which do not comprise
compulsory bargaining topics, is not in itself an unfair labor practice.
8
7
Although the act requires that one must bargain, it cannot be inferred
that either party has an enforceable right not to bargain with respect
78sSupra note 3.
79 Cox & Dunlop, Regulations of Collective Bargaining by the N.L.R.B., 63
Harv. L. Rev. 389, 395 (1950).
so Id. at 396.
81 Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
s2 Terminal R. Assn. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943).
83 Supra note 46.
84 79 Cong. Reg. 7660 (1935).
s5 Scope of Required Collective Bargaining under L.M.R.A., 50 (Colum. L. Rev.
351 (1950).
86 Ibid.
8756 Colum. Law Rev. 623 (1956).
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to matters outside the statutes. This result is contrary to the underlying
policy of the act which seeks generally to have the parties, rather than
the Board, determine the substantive nature of their agreements.As The
statute merely seeks to set forth the area in which collective bargaining
is legally required, but should not be interpreted as precluding parties
from exercising their economic power to force bargaining on all mat-
ters outside that area.89 Since concessions are not required, it would




ss Supra note 12 at 401-402, 408-409; Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective
Bargaining by the N.R.L.B., Supra note 73; cf. Findling and Colty, Regula-
tion of Collective Bargaining by the N.L.R.B., 51 Colum. L. Rev. 170 (1951).
s9 Supra note 87 at 624.
90 The Taft-Hartley removed from the area of Collective Bargaining: Close
Shop Agreement and under certain circumstances Union Shop and main-
tainance of membership contracts §§8a(3) 8(b) (2) and 9(e); checkoff of
union dues, except where authorized by individual employees §§302 (a), 302
(c) (4) and certain types of feather bedding agreements §8(b) (6) also the
Statute itself regulates employer contributions to union Welfare funds
§§302 (a), 302 (c) (5).
1960]
